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COMMENTS
PAYMENT OF TAXES AS A CONDITION OF
TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION:
A NINETEENTH CENTURY
ANACHRONISM
In California the basic statute governing the obtaining of title
to land by adverse possession is section 325 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.' This statute places California with the small minority
of states that unconditionally require payment of taxes as a pre-
requisite to obtaining such title. The logic of this requirement has
been under continual attack almost from its inception.2 Some of its
defenders state, however, that it serves to give the true owner notice
of an attempt to claim his land adversely.' Superficially, the law in
California today appears to be well settled, but litigation in which
the tax payment requirement is a prominent issue continues to arise.
With the present rapid urbanization of California, further litigation
attempting to quiet titles obtained by adverse possession will un-
doubtedly appear.4 This comment will explore the historical devel-
opment of the tax payment doctrine and the problems it poses, using
as an illustration the recent case of Schoenfeld v. Pritzker,5 and will
advance possible solutions to the conflicting points of view.'
1 "For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming
title, not founded upon a written instrument, judgment, or decree, land is deemed to
have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:
First-Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
Second-Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
"Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession be considered estab-
lished under the provision of any section or sections of this code, unless it shall be
shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period of five years con-
tinuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all the
taxes, State, county, or municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon such
land." CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 325 (West 1954).
See generally 'CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 318-19, 322-24, 326-28 (West 1954) ; CAL.
CiV. CODE § 1006 (West 1954) ; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West Supp. 1968). As a rule,
the courts hold that all applicable statutes must be read together. Comment, Adverse
Possession: Limitation of Actions: Operation of Section 318, Civil Code in Barring
Right as Well as Remedy, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 390, 391 n.2 (1929).
2 See notes 96 and 97 infra.
3 See, e.g., 'Comment, The Payment oj Taxes Requirement in Adverse Possession
Statutes, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 477, 479 (1949).
4 For example, an adverse claimant, contemplating sale, must first sue to quiet
title 'because the courts do not consider a title obtained by adverse possession to be
marketable. Gwin v. Calegaris, 139 Cal. 384, 73 P. 851 (1903).
5 257 Cal. App. 2d 117, 64 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1967).
6 For a general discussion of adverse possession in the United States, see Taylor,
Titles to Land by Adverse Possession, 20 IowA L. REV. 551 (1935).
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Among all the states California is unique in the derivation of its
land titles. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 18481 adopted exis-
ting Spanish and Mexican land grants as the basis for real property
ownership in California. These grants encompassed extremely large
areas, sometimes over 100,000 acres. Due to the lack of adequate
maps, boundaries of grants were often vague or ill-defined; at the
time of the California gold rush it was almost impossible to be cer-
tain of the true ownership of any particular piece of unsettled prop-
erty.' But, nearly all desirable land was either included or claimed
as part of a Mexican or Spanish grant.
The immigrants who came into California from other parts of
the West had been accustomed to look upon all unoccupied land as
government property. These immigrant settlers believed they had
an interest in the public domain, since it was the policy of the gov-
ernment to invite settlement of unoccupied land. Consequently, a
very large squatter interest developed. Many of these squatters
organized into associations which had a great influence on the polit-
ical, legislative, and judicial history of the state. Squatters also pre-
dominated on many juries, and judges depended heavily upon squat-
ter votes. In practice, therefore, large landholders found it impossible
to obtain a favorable judgment in an action of ejectment against a
squatter. Both sides ultimately resorted to force, and during the
1850's there were numerous squatter riots.9
To further complicate this uncertain situation, the Pacific Rail-
road Bill of 186210 authorized the Union Pacific and Central Pacific
Railroad Companies to construct the first transcontinental railroad.
In accordance with established practice, large areas of the public
domain were promised to the railroads as an incentive. As the rail-
roads planned their routes, the United States Land Office reserved
lands along the routes for grant to the railroads upon completion of
construction. However, settlers continued to move onto such lands
because they could not see the justice of being prohibited from set-
tling on vacant land that they considered to be the public domain."
Actually, the railroads wanted settlers along their rights-of-way
in order to provide customers for their services. For this reason they
7 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of
Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.
s See generally 6 H. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 529-81 (1888) (Bancroft's
Works, v. 23). For a complete history of California land development from the Indian
period through World War II, see W. ROBINSON, LAND IN CALIFORNIA (1948).
9 3 T. HITTELL, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 667-69 (1897).
10 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489.
11 R. RIEGEL, THE STORY OF THE WESTERN RAILROADS 38 (1926).
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often contributed to their own problems by offering such induce-
ments as land grants upon favorable terms to settlers who would
move onto their lands. But sometimes they later refused to grant
titles under the conditions they had implied. The Mussel Slough
Tragedy of 1880 in Tulare County, California, was a result of such
broken promises. Here, as elsewhere, the Southern Pacific, prior to
construction of its line, had encouraged settlers to move onto land
reserved by the Land Office by stating that when it obtained title,
the railroad would then sell the land to these settlers on very favor-
able terms. The figure most commonly mentioned was $2.50 per acre
with no increment for the value of improvements made by the set-
tlers. In fact, though, the railroad later offered the lands for sale to
any purchaser at their current appraised values of up to $35.00
per acre and gave no preference to the original settlers. Since the
settlers occupied by permission, this was not an adverse possession
situation. However, some settlers defended against ejectment suits
by claiming rights of preemption and, of course, lost.'2 When the
railroad made a subsequent attempt to eject them by force, the re-
sulting battle brought about the death of seven persons.' 3
Large landholders (and the railroads were the largest) there-
fore had good cause to worry about the security of their titles against
adverse possession. Such circumstances give rise to a strong infer-
ence that railroad influence was an important or even controlling
factor in legislation affecting titles to land in California.14
12 See, e.g., Southern Pac. R.R. v. Orton, 32 F. 457 (9th Cir. 1879).
13 See generally J. BROWN, THE MUSSEL SLOUGH TRAGEDY (1958).
14 "The paramount position of the railroad in the seventies is not easily compre-
hended by the present generation. . . . In the late nineteenth century all other enter-
prises were so overshadowed by the railroad as to be reduced to the stature of small
business. The railroad was the biggest landowner and the biggest employer of labor,
its owners were the richest men in the state, its influence on government was supreme,
and by arbitrary manipulation of freight rates it could make or 'break almost any
merchant, industrialist, or agriculturist in the state....
"California state government, never a glorious achievement of probity and effi-
ciency, sank in the seventies to the nadir of disreputableness. . . . No 'branch of gov-
ernment seemed to be exempt, neither the courts, the tax assessors, nor the executive
officers; yet it was the legislature that seemed to be guilty of the most flagrant abuses."
J. CAUGHEY, CALIFORNIA 381 (2d ed. 1953).
"[T]here was hardly an office, from the seats in the United States Senate down
through the governorship and the courts to the most inconsiderable town office, in
which the right man could not do the railroad a service. ...
"Thrice in the eighties and nineties the railroad's willingness to influence gov-
ernment was exposed with unmistakable candor. . . . [Tihe publication of the Colton
Letters . . . contributed much to the entertainment of the railroad baiters and to the
enlightenment of historians by reading into the record letter after letter in which
Huntington had described with utter frankness his methods as a lobbyist." Id. at
449-50.
"Through the '70s and early '80s the fact that California's War Governor [Leland
(Vol. 9
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This, then, is the atmosphere in which the tax payment amend-
ment" to section 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure was introduced
and passed. Senator Bernard D. Murphy of Santa Clara County in-
troduced the Bill on February 1, 1878;'0 it was then referred to the
Judiciary Committee and later passed by the Senate on March 26,
1878; 17 the Assembly then concurred in final passage on March 30,
1878.18 There is no record of either hearings or a report by the Judi-
Stanford] was its president continued to be helpful to the Central Pacific." 0. LEwIs,
THE BIG FouR 190 (1938).
In discussing the admission in 1874 of David D. Colton to "limited partnership"
with Crocker, Hopkins, Huntington, and Stanford, Mr. Lewis goes on to say, "It grew
clear that he [Colton] knew the political ropes in California, that he understood what
favors the railroad needed from legislatures and from city and county lawmakers, and
that he knew with certainty what steps were necessary to secure them." Id. at 291.
And later, "By this facile transaction the partners got the services of a politician
skilled in the practical phases of his art, who could do on the Coast what Huntington
was skillfully doing at Washington ... ." Id. at 292.
"The letters of HuNTINGTON published in yesterday's CHRONIcLE are an unexpected
revelation of the greed, the assumption, the meanness and the duplicity of the man-
agers of the Central Pacific. They contain little that we have not charged many
times over, but it needed proof like this personal confession to give to what have
hitherto been well-supported allegations the character of legal proof....
"It is, from a merely gymnastic standpoint, pleasant to observe how nimbly
HUNTINGTON runs over the gamut of intrigue and chicanery. His feet never become
entangled in any toils spread by the moral sense. From his logic conscience is con-
spiculously absent. He handles his soiled matter as if it were pure as snow. He proposes
to subsidize newspapers and to purchase legislatures as coolly as if such acts were
cardinal virtues. Like Satan, he evidently said long ago, 'Evil, be thou my good,' and
he intends to live up to his sinful compact.
"He is supposed to be a Republican, yet in his first letter he coolly proposes to
elect a Democrat, living on the line of the roads, to Congress, and in the second to
give him 'solid reasons for helping his friends.' That is, when he takes his seat he must
vote for all the corrupt schemes of those who have assisted in electing him. The 'solid
reasons' are the gilded bait offered the member for violating a public trust.
"The confidential declarations to kill off the Pacific Mail and gain possession of
the Union Pacific are striking for their naivete. Even more remarkable is the lofty
patronage or undisguised contempt with which the tools and dupes of the corporation,
whether distinguished Congressmen or eminent publishers of newspapers, are regarded.
A well-known Pacific coast Senator is patted on the back and called a 'good fellow';
a member of Congress from this State is spoken of as a 'wild hog,' and two San Fran-
cisco newspaper men who executed a somersault about the date of the writing are in
the railroad slang to be 'caved down a bank.' It must strike the sensitive minds of the
gentlemen thus elegantly designated that only a very handsome douceur in addition to
past favors can salve the wounds received from kicks like these, administered while
they, in the humble position of lackeys, are rendering the Central Pacific the best
service in their power." Editorial, San Francisco Sunday 'Chronicle, December 16, 1883,
at 4, col. 1.
15 S.B. 292, ch. 590, ACTS AMENDATORY OF THE CODES OF CALIFORNIA, 1877-78.
16 [1877-78] SENATE JOUR. 22d Sess. 177.
17 Id. at 502. Among the 28 Senators voting for passage were Murphy of San
Francisco, Murphy of San Luis Obispo, and Murphy of Santa Clara. The last was, of
course, Bernard D. Murphy. The second was Patrick W. Murphy, brother of Bernard.
Murphy of San Francisco was apparently no relation.
18 Id. at 545.
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ciary Committee. The record of floor debate shows only one minor
attempt to amend, which failed. 9
Whether or not Senator Murphy had any clear connection with
the railroad interests is uncertain," but there is no doubt that, as a
large landholder, he had common cause with them. At various times
subsequent to 1850, the Murphy family (Senator Murphy, his
father, and brothers) acquired 51,351.40 acres in Santa Clara
County, plus 61,307.98 acres in San Luis Obispo County and ap-
proximately 10,000 acres at Point Concepcion in Santa Barbara
County.2 ' The family utilized most of this land for agricultural or
grazing purposes. It was settled either sparsely or not at all. The
land was therefore in much the same condition as land belonging to
the railroads.
Since Senator Murphy did not have a reputation for unselfish-
ness or uprightness in all his business dealings, it is reasonable to
infer that his sponsorship of the amendment may have been moti-
vated by something other than considerations of public welfare.22
He was president of the Commercial & Savings Bank of San Jose,
and during his presidency the capital of the bank declined from
$500,000 to $150,000 because of unwise loans to various Murphy
family interests. Ultimately, the bank fell into serious financial diffi-
culty and was finally sold to the Giannini interests in 1909.23
19 Id. at 503. The proposed amendment would have added the words "to him or
them" at the end of the present text.
20 Senator Murphy was commonly known as "Barney." One of the famous Col-
ton Letters (see note 14 supra) reads as follows:
"Letter No. 466
New York, June 11, 1878
Friend Colton: Yours of May 31st, No. 91, with copy of Barney's letter is
received; I am going to Washington to-night, and I will see what can be
done in relation to the matter referred to in Barney's letter, as I think it is
of considerable importance. I have just written to Mr. Stanford in relation
to some matters that I think it important to attend to at once.
Yours truly,
C. P. Huntington"
Unfortunately, there is no further identification of "Barney" or the matter referred
to in his letter. 4 TESTIMIONY. ELLEN M. COLTON v. LELAND STANFORD, ET AL. SUPERIOR
COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, NOVEMBER 13, 1883, TO AUGUST 1, 1884, at
1832.
21 Interview with Clyde Arbuckle, Santa Clara 'County Historian, in San Jose,
California, December 20, 1968. The Murphys' Santa Clara County holdings consisted
of Rancho Pastoria de las Borregas, 4,894.35 acres; Rancho Ia Polka, 4,166.78 acres;
Rancho las Uvas, 11,079.93 acres; Rancho Ojo de Agua de la Coch, 8,927.10 acres;
and Rancho las Llagas, 22,283.24 acres. For details of their San Luis Obispo County
holdings, see note 23 infra.
22 However, the record is not entirely one-sided. Senator Murphy was also mayor
of San Jose for four terms. During that period he donated his entire salary to the
free public library. J. GUINN, HISTORY OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1388 (1904).
23 M. JAMES, BIOGRAPHY OF A BANK 48-52 (1954). The Commercial & Savings
Bank of San Jose might be considered the cornerstone of the branch banking system
of the Bank of America.
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The lack of California legislative history during the period
makes it all but impossible to determine the precise purpose of any
particular statute.24 But the history of the period makes it appear
very likely that the amendment to section 325 was pressed, in an
attempt to gain notice of adverse claims, either by holders of large
tracts of undeveloped land or by the railroads, or by both in com-
mon cause. The history of similar statutes in other states leads to a
similar conclusion.25
COMPARATIVE STATUTES AND DECISIONS
Today's statutes requiring payment of taxes for adverse posses-
sion not founded upon a written instrument stem from two major
sources. Some states require payment of taxes in all such situations;
others grant certain exceptions. The former apparently take their
pattern from the California statute of 1878. States with such strict
statutes currently include Idaho, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, and Utah, along with California. A
second group of states, granting varying exceptions from the require-
ment, seem to follow an Illinois statute of 1872, and include Arizona,
Murphy also apparently lacked some of the business acumen for which his father
and grandfather had been noted. He regularly played cards for high stakes. One day,
probably in 1893, there was a poker game at the Sainte 'Claire Club in San Jose, in-
volving, among others, two regular participants: James H. Henry and former Senator
Bernard D. Murphy. When all but these two had withdrawn, Henry, president of the
San Jose and Santa Clara Railroad Company, offered to wager his streetcar line against
Murphy's 22,000-acre Atascadero ranch. Murphy took the bet and lost. Henry later
sold the ranch for $40.00 per acre, or $880,000. C. McCaleb, The San Jose Railroads
38, Winter, 1969 (Local History Studies series published by Foothill Junior College
District).
There is some reason to doubt the accuracy of the 22,000-acre figure and, cor-
respondingly, of the $880,000 selling price. Rancho Atascadero, in San Luis Obispo
County, was granted by Governor Alvarado on May 6, 1842, to Trifon Garcia. It
was patented on June 18, 1860, to Henry Haight and consisted of 4,348.23 acres.
Haight in turn conveyed to Patrick W. Murphy (brother of Bernard Murphy) on Au-
gust 31, 1868. However, interests of the Murphy family in San Luis Obispo County also
included Rancho Santa Margarita, 17,734.94 acres, and Rancho Asuncion, 39,224.81
acres. The reference may be to one of the latter ranchos. See W. Robinson, The Story
of San Luis Obispo 'County 51-55, 1957 (pamphlet distributed by Title Insurance and
Trust Company, Los Angeles, California).
24 For a discussion of the limitations on research into legislative history in
California, see Van Alstyne & Ezer, Legislative Research in California: The Uncharted
Wilderness (pts. 1, 2), 35 Los ANcELEs BAR BULL. 116, 145 (1960).
25 "[T]he political activities of the 'Big Four' were no more reprehensible,
though vastly more successful, than those of thousands of other business and financial
leaders of their time. National and state governments alike were then honeycombed
with the dry rot of cynicism, rascality, brazen dishonesty, and strangely confused and
distorted ethical conceptions .... The mischievous activities of the agents of the Cen-
tral and Southern Pacific railroads, and the stranglehold the 'Big Four' gradually
established over state, county, and local governments, were thus not isolated phe-
nomena, but had their counterparts everywhere in the United States." R. CLELAND,
FROM WILDERNESS TO EMPIRE 320-21 (1944).
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Colorado, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Washing-
ton, beside Illinois.26
Even in Texas, where the tax payment requirement apparently
antedates all others,27 an early court, in Dutton v. Thompson, ex-
pressed doubt as to the reason for the statute:
28
It is not very clear why the legislature made the payment of taxes
necessary in order to sustain the defense of limitation based on five
years' adverse possession under a recorded deed. It may have been, to
this extent, to require evidence of good faith on the part of the oc-
cupant, to secure to the state and its municipal subdivisions the pay-
ment of taxes on the land, or to give further notice of the adverse claim
and of the time it would mature into title, if possession be not inter-
rupted, than afforded even by adverse possession under a recorded deed.
This Texas decision expresses the three theories of the requirement
which are still current today. For simplicity, they may be called the
good faith (or evidentiary) theory, the policing theory, and the no-
tice theory.29 The policing theory expresses the interest of the state
in assuring that taxes are paid. This rationale is self-evident and
needs no further comment, even though the value of the theory is
questionable when compared with other better means of securing
payment of taxes3 ° The good faith theory is generally accepted 1
and therefore merits only the brief attention given immediately below
in the discussion of United States v. Schwalby. The notice theory,
however, is controversial. Since it is the only one of the three theories
that could have been of direct benefit to the large landholders, this
comment will examine it in some depth.
26 For a tabulated comparison of all tax payment statutes, see Comment, The
Payment of Taxes Requirement in Adverse Possession Statutes, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 477,
482-83 (1949). Since publication of that comment, Montana has reduced its limitation
period from ten years to five years. REv. CODES MONT. § 93-2513 (Allen Smith 1964).
Otherwise the provisions listed are substantially the same, although the following states
have recodified their statutes: 'CoLo. REV. STATS. §§ 118-7-8, 118-7-9 (Bradford-Robin-
son 1964); ME. REV. STATS., tit. 14, § 816 (West 1965); NEv. REv. STATS. § 11.150
(1957) ; N.M. STATS. § 23-1-22 (Allen Smith 1954) ; UTAH CODE §§ 78-12-12, 78-12-
12.1 (1953) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 7.28.080 (Bancroft-Whitney & West 1961).
It is sometimes said (e.g., 37 CALIF. L. REV. supra at 480) that Alabama, Arkan-
sas, and Tennessee also have tax payment requirements, but in these states there are
no mandatory provisions. Tax payment merely provides an alternate method of ob-
taining title by adverse possession: CODE OF ALA., tit. 7, § 828 (Michie 1960) ; AR.
STATS. § 37-102 (Bobbs-Merrill Repl. 1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-201, 28-209, 28-
210 (Bobbs-MerriU 1955).
27 Act of February 5, 1841, § 16.
28 85 Tex. 115, - , 19 S.W. 1026, 1028 (1892). See also Annot., 132 A.L.R. 216,
218 (1941).
29 Another theory is that the requirement is peculiar to jurisdictions having short
limitation periods. For a discussion showing that this is simply not true, see Com-
ment, The Payment of Taxes Requirement in Adverse Possession Statutes, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 477, 479-80 (1949).
30 E.g., tax liens or tax sales.
81 See note 37 infra and accompanying text.
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A later Texas court, in United States v. Schwalby,32 said that
the doubt regarding the tax payment requirement, as expressed in
Dutton v. Thompson, was unreasonable. The court in Schwalby
stated that the 1858 case of Mitchell v. Burdett" had resolved all
doubts. 4 The Mitchell court had clearly pointed out that payment
of taxes was one of the incidents of true ownership. 5 In Schwalby
the Texas court said, "The payment of taxes is an incident of owner-
ship, and a circumstance which tends to show an honest belief, on
the part of one claiming under a deed, in the justice of his title."36
However, the fallacy of the reasoning in Schwalby is that the court
equates a circumstance of undoubted evidentiary value with a rigid
statutory prerequisite. Even states which do not have a statutory
requirement for payment of taxes recognize the fact of payment as
strong, though not controlling, evidence of a possessor's intent to
claim as his own.8 7 The statement of the court in Schwalby is there-
fore an expression of the good faith theory. This theory is difficult to
quarrel with in principle. However, a statute that rigidly specifies an
evidentiary test for good faith can easily work an injustice because
of the subjective nature of "good faith."
The basic premise of the notice theory is that payment of taxes
by a stranger will become a matter of public record and will thus
give the true owner notice of that stranger's intent to claim adversely.
Many authorities dispute the validity of this premise,88 but even if
accepted, the inconsistency of decisions as to what constitutes pay-
ment of taxes precludes any practical application of the notice
theory. The State of Washington exemplifies the glaring disagree-
ment that can arise within a single state. Under a seven-year statute
of limitation, the Washington Supreme Court held in Tremmel v.
Mess89 that the notice theory required that seven years must elapse
between the date of the first payment of taxes and the commencement
of suit to recover the land. The court therefore barred an action by
the adverse claimant where seven years' taxes had been paid over an
elapsed period of only four years. But, just two years later, in Lara
v. Sandell,4" where the occupant claiming adversely had purchased
32 87 Tex. 604, 30 S.W. 435 (1895), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stanley v.
Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1896).
33 22 Tex. 633 (1858).
34 87 Tex. at -, 30 S.W. at 437.
3 22 Tex. at 634.
36 87 Tex. at -, 30 S.W. at 437.
37 2 c.j.S. Adverse Possession § 178 (1936). Here too, though, the holdings are
not consistent.
38 See, e.g., Annot., 132 A.L.R. 216, 218-19 (1941).
39 46 Wash. 137, 89 P. 487 (1907). Accord, Burton v. Perry, 146 Ill. 71, 34 N.E.
60 (1893).
40 52 Wash. 53, 100 P. 166 (1909).
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at a tax sale and paid five of the seven years' taxes'at that time, the
same court held that its decision in Tremmel v. Mess added "ma-
terially to the language of the statute. ' 41 The court in Lara then
said that the defense of adverse possession was good, attempting to
distinguish the two cases on grounds that the earlier case (Tremmel)
involved vacant and unoccupied land, whereas the later (Lara) in-
volved a city lot. Still later, in Kennedy v. Anderson,42 the Washing-
ton court cited Tremmel v. Mess approvingly" and thus apparently
returned to its prior holding that taxes must be paid throughout the
full limitation period. But the court in Kennedy made no mention of
Lara v. Sandell, and that case still remains on the books to perpetuate
the inconsistency.
Further evidence of inconsistency in the application of the
notice theory is a South Dakota decision holding that there is sub-
stantial compliance with the tax payment requirement despite de-
linquency of one installment during a ten year limitation period.44
Probably no one would argue with the justice of this decision, but no
case has been discovered in any jurisdiction that decides the point
at which such delinquencies negate substantial compliance.
But, at the height of inconsistency, Montana completely under-
mines the rationale of the notice theory by holding that an adverse
claimant need not pay taxes each year as they become due. He may,
at any time during the limitation period, pay up all taxes theretofore
levied.4" Such a holding renders the notice theory meaningless. 40 And
even California has held in one case that reimbursement of the true
owner for taxes that he has paid satisfies the requirement.4 7 One com-
mentator interprets this holding to mean that payment of taxes "is
not required in order to serve as an additional notification to the
true owner .... .48
41 Id. at - , 100 P. at 167.
42 88 Wash. 457, 153 P. 319 (1915).
43 Id. at - , 153 P. at 321.
44 Murphy v. Redeker, 16 S.D. 615, 94 N.W. 697 (1903).
45 Barcus v. Galbreath, 122 Mont. 537, 207 P.2d 559 (1949).
46 For example, Nevada puts the notice theory in proper perspective when it
states: "If for the purpose of giving notice to the true owner that, perchance, an ad-
verse claimant has appeared upon the scene, his payment of taxes as notice of that
fact is entirely insignificant when compared to the circumstances of his open and
notorious possession of the land." Zubieta v. Tarner, 76 Nev. 243, -, 351 P.2d 982,
984 (1960).
47 Williams v. Stillwell, 217 Cal. 487, 19 P.2d 773 (1933). In another case where
reimbursement for taxes by the adverse possessor was held sufficient, the court, citing
Williams v. Stillwell, says: "It is well settled that the requirement of payment of taxes
is satisfied if payment is made by the claimant, or by someone on his behalf or in
privity with him." Cooper v. Carter Oil Co., 7 Utah 2d 9, -, 316 P.2d 320, 322
(1957).
48 22 CAIJF. L. REv. 111, 112 (1933).
[Vol. 9
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The aforementioned Montana and California holdings appear
to apply the coup de grace to the notice theory. However, Illinois
went to the opposite extreme and rigidly applied the notice theory
when it held that payment of taxes for six years and eight months
of the seven-year period, plus payment of an additional ten years'
delinquent taxes, did not satisfy the statute. 9
The courts have also been ambivalent in deciding the effect of
payment of taxes in connection with land sold for delinquent taxes.
In the leading California case of Owsley v. Matson0 the court held
that a redemption of land sold for delinquent taxes satisfied the re-
quirement of section 325. However, this is a minority view, and even
California has not applied it uniformly." Most courts hold that
neither the purchase of land at a tax sale nor redemption of land
from a tax sale constitutes a payment of taxes for the purpose of ad-
verse possession."
Although the incongruity of the above holdings throws doubt
on the validity of the notice theory, large landholders probably
espoused it as the only widely held theory that would have been di-
rectly beneficial to them. A relatively recent application of the notice
theory to obtain passage of a tax payment statute in Indiana 3 pro-
vides support for this hypothesis. Large corporations owned exten-
sive tracts of unoccupied lands in northern Indiana, but they were
losing these to "squatters" who obtained title by adverse possession.
Since the corporations were either unable or unwilling to settle the
land and obtain notice or foreclose adverse possessors in that man-
ner, they sought and obtained passage of the tax requirement by the
Indiana Legislature in 192 7.54
Although this recent corporate activity in Indiana did not in-
volve railroads, it gives additional support to the similar proposition,
that passage of tax payment requirements often resulted from lob-
bying efforts of the railroads. Early railroads obviously desired some
automatic notification of attempts to claim their lands adversely.
Since they owned such tremendous acreages in sparsely settled parts
of the country, they found it impractical to discover potential ad-
verse possessors by mere visual observation of their holdings. Sig-
49 Anderson v. Village Homebuilders, Inc., 401 Ill. 60, 81 N.E.2d 430 (1948).
50 156 Cal. 401, 104 P. 983 (1909).
51 See Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12, -, 268 P.2d 983, 984 (1954), and cases
cited in note 10 therein.
52 Annot., 132 A.L.R. 216, 248 (1941).
53 Ch. 42, § 1, Acts of 1927.
54 16 NOTRE DAME LAW. 216 (1941). See also Farabaugh & Arnold, Commentaries
on the Public Acts of Indiana, 1927-II, the Adverse Possession Act, 4 IND. L.J. 112(1928) ; Gavit, In Defense of the Indiana Adverse Possession Act of 1927, 4 IND. L.J.
321 (1929).
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nificantly, the tax payment requirement is in effect in states which
benefitted from more than 71 percent of the lands granted to en-
courage railroad construction. In this group of states, excepting
Texas, railroad land grants comprised over 12 percent of their com-
bined total area. Railroad land ownership in individual states ranged
from a low of 3 percent in Idaho to a high of 27 percent in Wash-
ington. 5 With such a concentration of land ownership, it would be
surprising if the railroads were not able, or even anxious, to influence
or procure legislation favoring their titles. Not coincidentally, the
great majority of tax payment statutes became effective during the
latter third of the nineteenth century.56 This was the greatest period
of railroad building and land settlement in the previously nearly
vacant western part of the United States.
55 Estimated area of land grants made by Congress to States, Territories, and
Corporations, 1850-1880; figures are based on total quantity to be given if all con-
templated railroads were constructed; the total includes approximately 5,000,000 acres
originally granted for construction of canals and military roads, but many of these
grants were subsequently converted to railroad use:
* Arizona 18,500,000 acres
* Montana 17,000,000 "
* California 16,387,000 "
* Washington 11,700,000
* New Mexico 11,500,000
* Minnesota 9,830,450 "
Kansas 8,223,380 "
* Dakota Territory 8,000,000 "
Nebraska 6,409,376 "
Oregon 5,800,000
Wyoming 4,500,000
Iowa 4,181,929
* Nevada 4,000,000
Wisconsin 3,553,865
Michigan 3,355,943
* Colorado 3,000,000 "
Alabama 2,807,648 "
Arkansas 2,613,631 "
Missouri 2,605,251 "
* Illinois 2,595,053 "
* Utah 1,850,000 "
* Florida 1,760,467 "
* Idaho 1,500,000 "
Louisiana 1,256,430 "
Mississippi 1,137,130
* Texas Note a
Total 154,067,553 acres
Note a: Texas also made substantial grants, but since there were no United States
lands in Texas, these grants were made by the State.
* States so indicated have a tax payment requirement as part of their ad-
verse possession statutes. Alabama and Arkansas might also be included. See
note 26 supra. Maine and Indiana are the only states with this type of statute
that are missing from the list.
Adapted from T. DONALDSON, THE PUBLic DOMA:I 268, 287 (1884).
56 Comment, The Payment of Taxes Requirement in Adverse Possession Statutes,
37 CALiF. L. REV. 477 n.3 (1949).
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CURRENT CALIFORNIA POSITION
Inconsistencies in the application of the tax payment require-
ment also prevail in California and are sometimes even amplified.57
In Schoenfeld v. Pritzker,58 an action to quiet title, plaintiff
owned a quarter section adjoining defendant's land. In 1939 plaintiff
constructed a pipeline along the common boundary but some 200
feet inside his own land. A power line and road were also built at
about the same time. Thereafter, defendant occupied the major por-
tion of the 200-foot strip by planting and harvesting annual crops of
grain. Plaintiff made no comment or attempt to interfere with this
use until he had a survey made in 1959. The survey established the
true boundary line and showed defendant's encroachment. Defen-
dant, however, refused to recognize this line and continued to plant
and harvest his crop. Plaintiff did nothing further until defendant
began to plant orange trees on the strip in 1963. At that time, some
twenty-four years after defendant's initial use of the strip, he noti-
fied defendant in writing of his encroachment and demanded that he
desist. When he did not, plaintiff brought suit in 1965.
Defendant based his claim on three main arguments: first, that
the five-year statute of limitation in section 318 of the Code of Civil
Procedure 9 barred plaintiff's action; second, that defendant had title
to the strip under the doctrine of agreed boundary; 60 and third, that
plaintiff's action was barred by laches. Although the court found
against defendant on all three arguments, only the first is considered
in detail in this comment.
Although the holding of the court in denying the application of
section 318 covered several specific points, all essentially relied on
the fact (undisputed by defendant) that he had not paid taxes on the
disputed strip and had therefore not established one of the essential
57 See note 51 supra.
58 257 Cal. App. 2d 117, 64 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1967).
59 "No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the
possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it appear that the plaintiff, his ancestor,
predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the property in question, within five
years before the commencement of the action." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 318 (West
1954).
60 The dividing line between the doctrines of adverse possession and agreed
boundary has been stated to be "the fiction that the agreed line attaches to the parties'
respective deeds." But the interpretation of what constitutes an "agreement" is un-
certain, and the California courts have not applied the concept uniformly. Comment,
Boundary Litigation in California, 11 SrA. L. REV. 720, 723 (1959).
In Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, 51 Cal. 2d 702, 336 P.2d 525 (1959), the
California Supreme Court said, in discussing an agreed boundary line, "'[T]he division
line, when thus established, attaches itself to the deeds of the respective parties, and
simply defines, not adds to, the lands described in each deed . . . .'" Id. at 709, 336
P.2d at 529.
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elements of adverse possession. The points discussed by the court
were: (1) that seisin, or possession, remains in the legal owner until
adverse possession has ripened into good title; 6' (2) that a mere
showing of legal title satisfies the possession requirement of section
318, so long as requirements of other applicable adverse possession
statutes are not fulfilled; (3) that the presumption of possession
being subordinate to the title of the legal owner 62 applies unless all
elements of adverse possession have been satisfied; and (4) that so
long as the possession was not of such nature that it could ripen
into valid adverse title, plaintiff was under no duty to take affirma-
tive action. All of these four conclusions, as expressed by the court,
depend upon defendant's satisfaction of the adverse possession re-
quirements of section 325. The missing requirement, deemed essential
by the court, was defendant's undisputed failure to pay taxes.
Defendant in Schoenfeld v. Pritzker relied heavily on Cocking
v. Fulwider.63 The holding of Cocking was essentially contrary to
the holding of Schoenfeld, though almost squarely in point on the
facts. In Cocking, another quiet title action, plaintiff had not pos-
sessed a disputed boundary strip for more than thirty years. Defen-
dant's predecessors had planted fruit trees on the strip, and defendant
continued to maintain them. The trial court found for the defendant
on his pleas of adverse possession, statute of limitations, laches, and
an agreed boundary line. The court of appeal affirmed the decision
but discussed in detail only the question of the application of the
statute of limitations. The court said:
The purpose of the code section [318] is to prevent the prosecution
of stale demands such as we have here, and for this purpose it limits
the remedy of the plaintiff, even though all the elements necessary to
establish adverse possession on defendant's part are not present.64
The court further said that since defendant and his predecessors had
been in undisputed actual possession for more than thirty years,
plaintiff was not in possession, and section 318 therefore barred his
action.
61 But see Farrer v. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271 P.2d 462 (1954), and notes 69
and 70 infra and accompanying text.
62 "In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof,
the person establishing a legal title to the property is presumed to have been possessed
thereof within the time required by law, and the occupation of the property by any
other person is deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, un-
less it appear that the property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal
title, for five years before the commencement of the action." CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §
321 (West 1954).
63 95 Cal. App. 745, 273 P. 142 (1928).
64 Id. at 748, 273 P. at 143 (emphasis added). Could the Schoenfeld court's re-
jection of Cocking be interpreted to mean that this court will no longer find a bar to
any action to recover real property merely because of passage of the limitation period?
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Despite the similarity of the cases, the Schoenfeld court refused
to accept Cocking as authority,65 but adopted the reasoning of a
critical 1929 law review comment. 66 The critic of Cocking believed
that the court had placed too narrow an interpretation on the term
"seized or possessed" as used in section 31867 by requiring actual
possession within the five-year period, as opposed to theoretical pos-
session under the common law theory of seisin.6 However, the com-
mon law theory of seisin was actual possession. The most effective
method of disseisin in early England was occupancy in fact and
planting and harvesting of crops. One noted authority states flatly,
"Seizin is possession."6 9 Although the equality of the two concepts
has been modified over the years, the common law concept of seisin
still requires possession. 70 It is therefore wrong to imply, as the court
did in Schoenfeld v. Pritzker, that seisin is mere legal title.7' Actu-
ally, the "narrow" interpretation of Cocking is more in line with the
common law theory on which the commentator allegedly relied. 72
The Schoenfeld court ignored a later comment on Cocking which
pointed out that in 1959 the supreme court had a clear opportunity
to attack Cocking but failed to do so. 78 This commentator continues:
Thus it cannot be said that the case [Cocking v. Fulwider] does not
represent the current California rule, even though the relative infre-
quency of its appearance in subsequent opinions may indicate that it is
destined to become "a derelict on the waters of the law." 74
His latter statement may eventually prove true, as common law
theories are modified. But several courts have cited Cocking75 as
65 257 Cal. App. 2d at 120, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
66 Comment, Adverse Possession: Limitation of Actions: Operation of Section
318, Civil Code in Barring Right as Well as Remedy, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 390 (1929).
67 See note 59 supra.
68 Comment, Adverse Possession: Limitation of Actions: Operation of Section 318,
Civil Code in Barring Right as Well as Remedy, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 390, 394 (1929).
But see Southern Pac. R.R. v. Whitaker, 109 Cal. 268, 41 P. 1083 (1895).
69 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 29 (2d ed. 1899).
70 "[T]he further back we trace our legal history the more perfectly equivalent
do the two words seisin and possession become . . . ." F. Maitland, The Mystery of
."eisin, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 591 (1909).
71 But see Code of Civil Procedure section 321, note 62 supra. The court in
Ychoenfeld stated that this section did not apply and relied on section 318 (note 59
s'4pra) instead. Apparently the court felt that seisin and possession are not the same.
72 For the modern American concept of seisin, see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 1.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 20 (3d ed. 1939).
73 Comment, Boundary Litigation in California, 11 STAN. L. REV. 720, 733 (1959).
74 Id.
75 Balestrieri v. Sullivan, 142 Cal. App. 2d 332, 340, 298 P.2d 688, 693 (1956)
Sibbett v. Babcock, 124 Cal. App. 2d. 567, 570, 269 P.2d 42, 44 (1954) ; Fickeisen v.
Feebler, 98 Cal. App. 2d 320, 324, 219 P.2d 864, 866 (1950); Housing Authority v.
Pirrone, 65 Cal. App. 2d 566, 568, 151 P.2d 22, 24 (1944) ; cf. Beneficial Life Ins.
Co. v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232, -, 270 P.2d 830, 836 (1954). But see 'Comment,
Boundary Litigation in California, 11 STAN. L. REV. 720, 733 n.89 (1959).
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authority for the proposition that actual possession is necessary to
satisfy the requirements of section 318. Since the courts of appeal
now disagree, the only way to resolve the dispute is by a clear-cut
California Supreme Court decision. The Schoenfeld case presented
this opportunity, but unfortunately the supreme court denied a hear-
ing. This refusal does not amount to a tacit disapproval of Cocking
and an approval of Schoenfeld because in 1929 the supreme court
also denied a hearing on Cocking v. Fulwider. A claim that Schoen-
feld is now approved amounts to unwarranted speculation.
Another reason for the necessity of a supreme court decision
is that the court of appeal in Schoenfeld failed to answer defendant's
principal contention that the rule of the more recent supreme court
case of Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church76 barred plaintiff's action
under section 318. 77 In Ernie, also an action to quiet title to a dis-
puted boundary strip, the supreme court denied defendant's plea of
adverse possession because plaintiff, and not defendant, had paid the
taxes. Nevertheless, the court found for defendant under the doc-
trine of an agreed boundary 78 and held that plaintiff's action was
barred, in part, because she failed to show actual possession as re-
quired by section 318. Apparently the court felt that plaintiff must
show at least a complete chain of title.79 Consideration of this lan-
guage might have brought about an opposite result in Schoenfeld.
Furthermore, in Ernie, the supreme court cited with approval"
76 51 Cal. 2d 702, 336 P.2d 525 (1959).
77 Schoenfeld v. Pritzker, 257 Cal. App. 2d 117, 119, 64 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (1967).
78 The court first determined: "It is true that the judgment for the defendant
cannot be supported on any theory of title by adverse possession because of the
affirmative showing and finding of payment of taxes by the plaintiff since the acquisi-
tion of her deed. . . . The trial court found that no taxes had been levied or assessed
upon any easement in the disputed strip, but it made no finding that the defendant
had acquired a prescriptive easement. While such a finding could have been made it
would not support the judgment quieting the title in the defendant in fee." 51 Cal. 2d
at 707, 336 P.2d at 528.
79 "The plaintiff did not offer evidence to establish a prima facie case on any of
these alternatives or to overcome the 'bar of the statute of limitations contained in
section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was offered to deraign her
title from the government or to show that any common grantor appeared in the chain
of title of herself and the defendant. What title the plaintiff's grantor had or how
she acquired it does not appear, and no proof was offered that she or her grantor ever
had possession. The mere introduction of the deed from her immediate grantor was
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. [citations omitted]. The plaintiff, there-
fore, failed to prove either legal title or actual possession and judgment was properly
entered denying her any relief." Id. at 706-07, 336 P.2d at 528.
However, in a recent case, one appellate court has stated that a finding of an
agreed boundary by inference due to long acquiescence is justifiable only in the
exceptional case. The court distinguished Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church as being
that exceptional case. Dooley's Hardware Mart v. Trigg, 270 A.C.A. 368, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1969).
80 51 Cal. 2d at 706, 336 P.2d at 528.
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Haney v. Kinevan,8' on which defendant in Schoenfeld also relied. 2
Haney was a boundary case in which plaintiff failed to adduce ev-
idence showing that he had been in possession of a disputed strip
within five years of the action. The court held that plaintiff's action
was barred because he had not been seised or possessed of the land
as required by section 318.
Thus the "loophole" established by Cocking and implicitly ap-
proved by Ernie suggests that the apparently rigid California tax
payment requirement can be bent with judicial insistence. Schoenfeld
mistakenly rejected this opportunity and simultaneously confused
the matter. In short, the holdings of the courts of appeal are suffi-
ciently confusing so that resolution by the California Supreme Court
is necessary.
BOUNDARY DISPUTES
A similar confusion prevails in California in cases involving
disputed common boundaries. While a detailed discussion of bound-
ary doctrines is beyond the scope of this comment, courts frequently
invoke boundary principles in order to avoid resting a decision upon
adverse possession. This may be done when a strict application of
adverse possession principles (and the tax payment requirement)
would produce a result that appeared unjust in the eyes of the court.
Adverse possession and agreed boundary principles are closely
related and are frequently confused; 8 but they are, at least the-
oretically, applicable to different factual situations. 4 But because of
the uncertainty regarding which rules are to be applied, it is difficult
81 73 Cal. App. 2d 343, 166 P.2d 361 (1946).
82 257 Cal. App. 2d at 119, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
83 One commentator states that an important difference is implied in the terms
themselves: " 'Adverse' possession suggests an element of hostility. 'Acquiescence' [an
essential element of the agreed boundary doctrine] suggests an element of consent."
Beck, Boundary Litigation and Legislation in North Dakota, 41 N.D. L. REV. 425, 466
(1965).
On the same point another commentator states: "The thought of acquiescence as
prescriptive, nevertheless, is pervasive. This in turn leaves doubt about its relation to
the doctrine of adverse possession. It is startling how often courts, although speaking
in terms of acquiescence, have not made it clear which doctrine they were applying or
even whether they recognize any difference between them. In other cases, some of
which have.come from the same courts that on other occasions have confused the doc-
trines, the separate existence or varying requirements of the two doctrines have been
expressly declared." Browder, The Practical Location of Boundaries, 56 MicH. L. REV.
487, 512 (1958).
84 "Considering all of the various jurisdictions in the United States, the doctrine
[of agreed boundary] is still in a chaotic condition, and no one has yet undertaken
to point out definitely the circumstances under which it is applicable." Annot., 69
A.L.R. 1430, 1431 (1930). See also Annot., 113 A.L.R. 421 (1938) (supplementary).
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to predict the outcome of a case that is not clearly identifiable as
one or the other of the two factual situations. Schoenfeld v. Pritzker
was such a case.
To bring such a dispute within the rules of agreed boundary in
California, three elements must be present: (1) an uncertainty as
to the true boundary, (2) an agreement between the parties fixing
the line, and (3) acquiescence in the line so fixed for a period equal
to the statute of limitations.8" The same statutes of limitation apply
as in the case of an action to recover real property from an adverse
possessor, and they present many of the same difficulties.
Two of the most difficult questions under the California agreed
boundary doctrine are, what is uncertainty, and what is agreement? 86
In Schoenfeld v. Pritzker 7 an alternative argument, which the court
did not accept, presented both of these questions (as do many ad-
verse possession cases involving contiguous landowners). California
takes two views of uncertainty: objective uncertainty and subjective
uncertainty.88 Defendant in Schoenfeld argued the former: that
plaintiff's long-continued failure to object to his use of the strip
for annual crops had caused an agreed boundary to arise by im-
plication. The court rejected this contention and followed the doc-
trine of Clapp v. Churchill,9 which holds that there can be no bound-
ary agreement where the true line can be readily established (as was
done in 1959 by plaintiff's survey). In so holding, the court found no
objective uncertainty. When objective uncertainty is present, the
California courts normally grant judgment for the defendant, pro-
vided he can also establish an agreement. The court's other alterna-
tive would have been to follow the theory of subjective uncertainty,
upon which the California courts are divided." However, defendant's
argument in support of this theory would have been difficult in view
of the results of the 1959 survey. Since the court took the objective
uncertainty approach, and found no uncertainty, it never reached
defendant's argument of an implied agreement. Thus the court was
85 Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, 51 Cal. 2d 702, 707, 336 P.2d 525, 528
(1959).
86 "These requirements envisage a situation where the parties, being uncertain
as to the location of the true boundary, have agreed, either expressly or impliedly,
to resolve this uncertainty by establishing a boundary in lieu of the true line." Com-
ment, Boundary Litigation in California, 11 STAN. L. REV. 720, 723 (1959).
87 257 Cal. App. 2d 117, 64 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1967).
88 Comment, Boundary Litigation in California, 11 STAN. L. REV. 720, 723 (1959).
There is subjective uncertainty where the true boundary is capable of being accurately
ascertained but the parties are not certain of the true boundary. On the other hand,
objective uncertainty is present where the boundary is not reasonably ascertainable
by reference to deeds, maps, or prior surveys.
89 164 'Cal. 741, 130 P. 1061 (1913).
90 Comment, Boundary Litigation in California, 11 STAN. L. REV. 720, 723 (1959).
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precluded from using any boundary theory in order to avoid the
harshness of a strict application of the tax payment requirement.
But if the court had reached this question, no doubt a similar
conflict would have arisen between the "contract theory" and the
"prescription theory" of an agreement.91 Courts that follow the "con-
tract theory" find for the legal owner on grounds of either lack of a
true agreement or mutual mistake of fact. Courts following the "pre-
scription theory" tend to avoid the issue of agreement and substitute
an adverse possession rationale to find for the claimant? According
to one commentator, the clear trend of California boundary cases is
to adopt a "prescription theory" closely akin to the underlying
policy of adverse possession which favors stability and repose of
titles? 3
When the courts do adopt this "prescription theory," they may
also take a liberal approach to the tax payment requirement.M If the
courts adopted a strict approach to assessment, based on the exact
deed description, they would find themselves caught again in strict
adverse possession principles and in the tax payment requirement.
Many cases in California and other states, therefore, adopt the
visual approach to assessment and state:
[T]he natural inference would be that the assessor put the value on
the land and improvements of each party as disclosed by the visible
possession, rather than that he ascertained the true line by a careful
survey and assessed to one a part of the possessions of the other .... 95
Thus taxes assessed on a readily visible encroachment would satisfy
the tax payment requirement regardless of the description in the
deed.
In Schoenfeld, however, defendant did not include the theory
of a visual assessment in his arguments for either adverse possession
or agreed boundary. If he had done so, would the result have been
different, even under the same facts? Again, the inconsistencies in
the rules strongly suggest an affirmative answer.
91 Id. at 725.
92 Where a claimant in a boundary case can establish neither adverse possession
nor an agreed boundary, the California courts have sometimes found in his favor on
a theory of estoppel. Id. at 728. This argument was not used in Schoenfeld v. Pritzker.
Other theories sometimes used in boundary cases are (1) the concept of a new monu-
ment as a fixed boundary and (2) the concept of "practical location." Id. at 733. See
also Browder, The Practical Location of Boundaries, 56 MIcn. L. REV. 487 (1958).
93 Comment, Boundary Litigation in California, 11 STAN. L. REV. 720, 726 (1959).
94 Id. at 721.
95 Price v. DeReyes, 161 Cal. 484, 490, 119 P. 893, 895 (1911). Accord, Euse v.
Gibbs, 49 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1951) ; Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359, 262 P.2d 1006
(1953); Skala v. Lindbeck, 171 Minn. 410, 214 N.W. 271 (1927); King v. Bassindale,
127 Wash. 189, 220 P. 777 (1923).
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CRITICISMS OF THE TAX PAYMENT REQUIREMENT
Many of these boundary situations, and inequitable results of
some adverse possession cases, have stimulated resounding criticisms
of the tax payment requirement almost from its inception. Both
courts"8 and commentators97 have called the requirement harsh,
anomalous, or inapplicable.
In line with these comments, courts outside of California have,
when the results seemed otherwise unjust, taken some rather extreme
positions in order to evade the tax payment requirement. In a Utah
case the tax payment requirement prevented defendant from obtain-
ing title by adverse possession where his building encroached on
plaintiff's lot.9 8 However, the court found that defendant had ac-
quired an easement for the life of his building. In city lot boundary
cases, regardless of the question of agreement, Idaho holds that a
fence controls the description in an assessment made by lot number.99
Payment of taxes thus assessed satisfies the requirement. Indiana,
despite the lack of any exception in its statute,x0 faces squarely up
96 Typical comments are that the requirement does not apply "to a small strip
along a boundary line." McDonald v. Drew, 97 Cal. 266, 270, 32 P. 173, 174 (1893)
(concurring opinion); that it "has no natural relation whatever to the matter of
actual adverse possession of land . . . ." Eberhardt v. Coyne, 114 Cal. 283, 287, 46 P.
84, 85 (1896) (dissenting opinion); that it is an "anomalous law." McDonald v.
MCCoy, 121 Cal. 55, 73, 53 P. 421, 426 (1898); that it is a "harsh rule to apply."
Crane v. Judge, 30 Utah 56, -, 83 P. 566, 567 (1905) ; that "his misfortune is a
hardship beyond the power of this court to redress." Central Pac. R.R. v. Tarpey, 51
Utah 107, -, 168 P. 554, 560, 1 A.L.R. 1319, 1328 (1917) ; and that "it proves
harsh to the possessor .... " Lykes Bros. v. Brautcheck, 106 So. 2d 582, 586 (Fla.
App. 1958).
07 "[Biecause of the harshness in this type situation, it might be desirable for
the legislature to enact a proviso, similar to the one in force in another state [Minne-
sota], that this statute should not be applicable to mistaken boundary situations." 1
U. FLA. L. REV. 291, 293 (1948). "[T]he benefits derived therefrom are uncertain,
the legislative purpose difficult to determine, and the effect unfortunate and anomalous
in view of the policy underlying adverse possession." Comment, The Payment of
Taxes Requirement in Adverse Possession Statutes, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 477, 478 (1949).
"[Ilt is illogical to require that there be an agreed boundary to satisfy the tax
requirement of adverse possession in the contiguous landowner situation." 32 S. CAL.
L. REV. 90 (1958). "It seems apparent that application of the tax requirement to the
disputed boundary situation effectively prevents accomplishment of this objective [to
correct errors in conveyancing]." Comment, Boundary Litigation in California, 11
STAN. L. REV. 720, 721 n.6 (1959). "[Tlhe payment of taxes requirement should be
eliminated from section 325, at least insofar as that section applies to the disputed
boundary situation." Id. at 734.
98 Malouf v. Fischer, 108 Utah 355, 159 P.2d 881 (1945).
99 Calkins v. Kousouros, 72 Idaho 150i 237 P.2d 1053 (1951) ; Mulder v. Stands,
71 Idaho 22, 225 P.2d 463 (1950) ; Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 105 P. 1066
(1909).
100 "Hereafter in any suit to establish title to lands or real estate no possession
thereof shall be deemed adverse to the owner in such manner as to establish title or
rights in and to such land or real estate unless such adverse possessor or claimant
shall have paid and discharged all taxes and special assessments of every nature falling
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to the problem and holds that in disputed boundary situations pos-
session is sufficient, despite failure to pay taxes. 1 1
In 1939 Florida became the most recent state to add a tax pay-
ment requirement. 0 This addition has contributed to increased lit-
igation and has brought about at least one strongly unfavorable
comment. 10  In Palmer v. Greene,04 one of the first cases to arise
under the new statute, the court first held that payment of taxes was
not required in a boundary dispute involving city lots, where the
fence was not on the true boundary. The court's grounds were that
plaintiff's choice of the quiet title action was improper and that he
should have brought ejectment. The court then reasoned that since
the proper remedy was ejectment, and since the legislature had
surely not intended to abolish the common law remedy of ejectment,
the tax payment requirement was inconsistent and could not apply.
Obviously, though, the court was confused, and it reversed itself on
rehearing, holding that the equitable action to quiet title was proper,
and that payment of taxes was required. In this case, the court ap-
parently felt that the tax payment requirement produced an unjust
result. Therefore, it tried, though unsuccessfully, to find another
basis for its decision. In later litigation in Florida, the judicial feel-
ing against the unjustness of the requirement evidently became
stronger. 0 5 Finally, in 1961, one appellate court took a boundary
case out from under the requirement of the statute by holding that
when an adverse claimant fenced a disputed strip, the fencing in-
tegrated the strip into his lands and gave him color of title, so that
due on such land or real estate during the period he claims to have possessed the same
adversely:. Provided, however, That nothing in this act shall relieve any adverse pos-
sessor or claimant from proving all the elements of title by adverse possession now
required by law." IND. STATS. ANN. § 3-1314 (Bobbs-Merrill 1968).
101 Echterling v. Kalvaitis, 235 Ind. 141, 126 N.E.2d 573 (1955) ; Nasser v. Stahl,
126 Ind. App. 709, 134 N.E.2d 567 (1956).
102 "Where it shall appear that there has been an actual continued occupation for
seven years of premises under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, but not
founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, the premises so actually
occupied, and no other, shall be deemed to have been held adversely; provided that
during the period of seven years aforesaid the person so claiming adverse possession
without color of title shall have within a year after entering into possession made a
return of said property by proper legal description to the assessor of the county
wherein situated and has subsequently, during each year paid all taxes theretofore or
thereafter levied and assessed against the same and matured installments of special
improvement liens theretofore or thereafter levied and assessed against the same by
the state and county and by city or town, if such property be situated within anyincorporated city or town, before such taxes become delinquent." FLA. STATS. § 95.18
(1965).
103 See 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 291, 293 (i948) note 97 supra. [Cited with approval
in Lykes Bros. v. Brautcheck, 106 So. 2d 582, 586 (Fla. App. 1958) ].
104 159 Fla. 174, 31 So. 2d 706 (1947).
105 Holley v. May, 75 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1954); Euse v. Gibbs, 49 So. 2d 843
(Fla. 1951).
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a different statute applied." 6 This holding is analogous to the Cal-
ifornia fiction that an agreed line attaches to the deeds. 7
Minnesota is the only state which unqualifiedly faces the prob-
lem of the tax payment requirement in boundary cases. In 1913 Min-
nesota added a provision to its statute specifically exempting
disputed boundary situations from the tax payment requirement.
08
A Minnesota court later expressed the purpose of this addition by
saying, "A peculiarly useful application of the doctrine of adverse
possession is in the settlement of disputed or mistaken boundary
lines. 'The object of the statute is to quiet titles and end disputes.'
[citation omitted]."' °9 Since that time there has been very little
litigation on the subject in Minnesota.
CONCLUSION
Although the origin and reasons for the tax payment require-
ment, as an essential statutory element of adverse possession, are
obscure, the statutes were probably enacted because of the lobbying
activities of large landholders, principally the western railroads.
These landholders apparently proceeded under some version of the
notice theory, which has been proven unsound by subsequent court
decisions under the statutes."' Furthermore, even if the notice theory
is accepted, there are serious questions whether a need exists for this
type of notice under modern conditions and whether any notice is
actually communicated to the true owner. Except in Alaska, the pub-
lic domain of the United States has practically vanished, and if land
is sufficiently desirable for a legal owner to be interested in retaining
it, surely it is not asking too much to require him to make an inspec-
tion of the land, either personally or by representative, once every
five years."' Such a duty would help promote the general public
policy in favor of full utilization of land. Under circumstances exis-
ting today, therefore, the requirement is an anachronism.
One possible solution to the problem is a more liberal interpre-
tation of the requirement by the courts, such as greater adoption of
106 Kiser v. Howard, 133 So. 2d 746 ('Fla. App. 1961).
107 See note 60 supra.
1os "The provisions of paragraph two [the tax payment provision] shall not
apply to actions relating to the boundary line of lands, which boundary lines are
established by adverse possession . . . ." MINN. STATS. ANN. § 541.02 (West Supp.
1967).
10 Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356, -, 209 N.W. 257, 259, 46 A.L.R.
785, 788 (1926).
110 But see 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 291 (1948).
III Under normal circumstances, no state with a tax payment requirement pre-
scribes a limitation period of less than five years. Mining claims are an exception.
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visual approach to assessment."n By an extension of that doctrine,
the courts in California, as they have in other states, could probably
take most boundary cases out from under the requirement of section
325 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 3
This solution will not work, though, in adverse possession cases
that do not involve contiguous boundaries. Here, legislative action to
repeal the tax payment requirement is probably the only fully effec-
tive solution. This is not to say, however, that the evidentiary value
of payment of taxes as an indication of a possessor's intent to claim
adversely should be eliminated. The logic of such a position is in-
disputable. But since it is already generally recognized, even without
the benefit of legislation," 4 no action is necessary in this respect.
However, care must be exercised in drafting repealing legislation to
insure that no inadvertent damage is simultaneously done to the
evidentiary position of tax payment.
Averill Q. Mix
112 See cases cited note 95 supra.
113 See note 1 supra.
114 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 178 (1936).
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